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Summary: 
In international politics, language is core in inter-state trust and relationship, 
and the West African region (or sub-region), which is multi-ethnic, culturally 
plural and bi- or multilingual in imported languages, may never evolve an inte-
grated region if the diversity is not converted from source of disconnections to 
source of connections. At best, West Africans have regarded themselves as pre-
colonial kinsmen but post-colonial strangers as a result of the factor of lan-
guage barriers created in the years of colonial rule. The Yoruba, Ewe, Ashante, 
Mende, Temne and many more had similarities of languages and cultures and 
led a regular life of communal conflict and cooperation until the arrival of the 
French, English, Portuguese and Germans, who established sharp misunder-
standings and divisions along the lines of European lingua franca. From a par-
ticipation-observation experience and perspective, and having consulted litera-
ture and government records on futile integration efforts, the study, adopting a 
functionalist model for analysis, submits that the differences have led to aliena-
tion among West Africans since independence, and ECOWAS, despite its spirit-
ed commitment to regional integration by the protocol on free movement across 
the borders, has faced brick-walls from human and social forces engendered by 
language barriers. This paper looks beyond the artificial linguistic barriers 
inherent in the bilingual or multilingual character of West Africa, by exploring 
the richness of the linguistic diversity to advance the cause of regional integra-
tion. The paper strongly advocates that local languages spoken across most of 
the West African states such as Hausa, Mandingo, Peul and Yoruba be taught 
in primary and secondary schools, while ECOWAS leaders should agree on 
making English, French and Portuguese compulsory in all secondary schools 
and higher institutions in their respective countries. These will help demystify 
and dismantle the artificial linguistic barriers created by the accident of colo-
nialism and make the formal and informal instruments, including ECOWAS 
towards integration, more functional.  
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Introduction 
 
West Africa is a vast territory with about 1,500 spoken native languages of 
the 2,500 total number of local languages spoken in Africa, which implies that 
the sub-continent alone constitutes seventy-five per cent of the entire spoken 
languages of the continent1. A region made up of 15 countries politically and 
economically grouped into the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), West Africa has evolved some of the most popularly spoken lan-
guages on the continent; Hausa, Yoruba, Peul and Mandingo being four of the 
most commonly spoken across the borders. Other widely spoken languages 
include Ewe, Creole, Berber, Igbo and Ashanti. By reason of history, the peo-
ples of West Africa were closely knit socio-culturally, economically and politi-
cally and language experts have identified language family groups that under-
line the significant pre-colonial ethnic and cultural ties between the peoples2, a 
thesis scholars have also validated by research findings that show the presence 
of same ethnic group in long stretches of land or territory that cut across several 
present-day or post-colonial territorial demarcations3. 
Research has shown that three of the four major ethnic/language groupings 
are present in West Africa4. These include Afroasiatic (or Hamito-Semitic), 
Niger-Congo and Nilo-Saharan branches. The Berber and Chadic languages 
spoken around the Lake Chad area comprising Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon and 
Niger, as well as the Tuareg of Burkina Faso and Mali constitute the Afroasiatic 
language branch. The Atlantic or Niger-Congo languages, which include Wol-
of, Fula and Serer are spoken in large parts of Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Senegal 
and The Gambia; while the Kwa, Mende and Gur language groups, which 
stretch from as far as Liberia to Ghana, Togo and Southwest Nigeria, complete 
the Niger-Congo family in West Africa. The Nilo-Saharan language group is 
not as large, but it has some semblance with the Afro-asiatic language family.   
The indigenous languages are not the problem, per se, of this study, but the 
imported languages from Europe, which have redefined the social, cultural, 
political and historical contexts of the West African sub-continent. From the 
brief outline above, it is clear that the language factor was more of a unifying 
element in West Africa before the advent of English, French and Portuguese in 
West Africa. It is pertinent to note that the over one thousand languages no 
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longer count in the contemporary scheme of things as the global languages have 
since become the “currency of exchange” in Africa and international politics, 
and are, as such, the factor for social integration or disintegration. 
Ironically, the three foreign languages, which have become the region’s 
lingua franca, should have been a unifying factor as the 1,500 ethnic groups 
would no longer be divided along 1,500 ethnic or linguistic lines. However, 
reverse is the case as the imported languages, particularly English and French 
have had more divisive influences on the peoples and countries of the region. 
The languages have come with much deeper inbuilt elements, such as ideology, 
philosophy and cosmology of the patrons, which have created sharply different 
identities among the recipients of the languages in West Africa. This is same 
for the entirety of the continent. 
In post-colonial West Africa, the Francophones and Anglophones are two 
different Africans, whose allegiance is first and foremost to their metropolitan 
lords whose French and English have created a bond within Francophone and 
Anglophone blocs as well as bond between the blocs and their overlords, but 
disunity between the two West African blocs. This, for historians and political 
scientists has been the very factor in futile attempts at regional economic and 
political integration5 at informal or formal levels, including the ECOWAS 
mechanism to bring about regional unity. This paper thus constitutes a study on 
the bilingual and indeed multilingual bottlenecks towards the attainment of 
integration and how these bottlenecks can be converted to solvents for West 
Africa. 
 
Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks 
 
In contemporary global politics, integration is a concept that has passed 
through stages of redefinitions. Ordinarily, integration simply refers to a pro-
cess of evolving an inclusive society, at any level. The concept is often viewed 
from a sociological lens, which connotes cultural bond and affinity; and from a 
political perspective, integration would mean a unification process, or some-
times be simply defined as unity. As a result of developments in Europe and 
North America, integration is taking the form of economic union and growing 
political interdependence. It is translating to dismantling of borders and barriers 
to movement of people, ideas, goods and services. This has informed, among 
other things, an evolution of the European common market, common currency 
and integrated immigration laws6. 
The development around the world, particularly in Europe has informed the 
redefinition of integration in Africa and West Africa. The ECOWAS and AU, 
originally formed for economic and political cooperation between states of the 
                                                 
5
 M. Kwanashie , Historical Perspective on the Scramble for Africa, [in:] New Scramble 
for Africa, C.E. Osita , C.A. Anigbo (ed.), Lagos 2010. 
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sub-continent and continent respectively, have adapted the western model of 
economic and political integration, employing same integrative mechanisms 
such as visa-less and free movement protocols, common bank, currency and 
parliament7. But that kind of integration has been hampered by entrenched dis-
trust and mutual suspicions between West Africans created by linguistic differ-
ences and lack of communication/understanding between them. Language is the 
key in international politics as it facilitates communication, establishes relation-
ship and strengthens understanding and trust.  
In terms of language, the problem of West Africa is multilingualism and bi-
lingualism. Multilingualism refers to the presence of more than two major lan-
guages in a social space. Multilingualism in West Africa has created multiple 
leakages in the integration attempt, both at the formal and informal levels, 
namely between the social groups or nationals of countries and between gov-
ernments of the region. It must however be understood that for the purpose of 
this paper, multilingualism does not refer to the existence of 1,500 native lan-
guages spoken in West Africa, but to the influx since the pre-colonial times 
from the fifteenth century, of foreign languages, such as French, English, and 
Portuguese.  
Bilingualism is the major thrust of this paper. This is because in all of West 
Africa, there are two main language, cultural, ideological and political blocs- 
Francophone and Anglophone. Lusophone is less contentious as Portuguese is 
spoken only in the smaller countries of Cape Verde and Guinea Bissau, and 
besides, these countries align more with their Francophone counterparts. There 
are sixteen countries in West Africa, fifteen of which are members of ECO-
WAS. Five of these countries are English-speaking; nine are French-speaking 
while the remaining two are Portuguese-speaking states. In number, the 
strength of ECOWAS are the Francophone states; but in terms of resources, the 
ECOWAS fulcrum is the Anglophone state of Nigeria8. The two Lusophone 
states are like bystanders, which has made them, probably because of proximity 
to the Francophone countries, to have more relationship with Francophone 
West Africa. 
Bilingualism for this paper will therefore be in the context of the dominat-
ing influence of English and French in the formal and informal life of the re-
gion. The contention is and has always been between French and English-
speaking countries of West Africa, with France playing a key role in balancing 
of power in a sub-continent perceived to be dominated by Anglophone Nige-
ria9. The French colonial and post-colonial policy of assimilation is further 
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ror”, Lagos, July 2015. 
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strengthened to knit the bloc closely together and grow its bond and allegiance 
to France10. It is this context of bilingual forces at play in West Africa that 
forms the framework for discourse in the paper.  
Having examined the contexts of integration and the lingua franca issues, 
it is appropriate to situate the concepts and issues in a theoretical context. The 
workability of integration processes is obscured by a dysfunctional society, 
structure and mechanism. If ECOWAS is to work and engender its major objec-
tive of regional integration, the language factor has to be considered as central 
in their discussions. A functional structure will more likely put together a func-
tional mechanism. The functionality of ECOWAS is dependent on the func-
tionality of processes, such as erasing or reducing the language barrier among 
West Africans.  
This is why the functionalist theory becomes a framework for analysis. In-
deed, functionalism has been one of the theories that have defined the integra-
tion initiative in West Africa. In the works of Asiwaju11 and Le Vine12, a dis-
tinction has been made between two sub-interrelated levels of regional integra-
tion in West Africa. These are the functionalism and neo-functionalism as well 
as the political or constitutional type otherwise referred to as Federation, which 
Adetula13 however perceives as inadequate in the theoretical positioning of 
ECOWAS, the regional body to superintend over the integration process.  
The school of thought that functionalism may be inadequate to examine the 
totality of regional integration also holds for all the Less Developed Countries 
(LDCs), as it is believed that regional integration in the South is conditioned by 
different socio-economic and political dynamics from that of the developed 
countries. Flowing from this, Fayomi and Adeola14 argue therefore that, region-
al integration in Africa must recognize the processes of economic, political and 
social integration and also provide for the political weapon for implementing 
the programmes and policies. In fact, Bulmer15 even argues for a shift from 
such supra-nationalism/inter-governmentalism debacle to the intricate connec-
tions between the domestic and regional levels, that is, increasing people to 
people interaction. 
One cannot agree more with the position above in a holistic study of re-
gionalism. But when looking at the ethnic or linguistic factor in regionalism or 
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regional integration, it would be seen that the position would be like digging for 
gold in a coal mine or using a paracetamol tablet to heal a wound. Rather, func-
tionalism identifies the fundamentals, such as lingual or such deep social infrac-
tions, and then goes beyond scratching the surface (like most other studies of 
regionalism do, when they discuss very serious theoretical issues) and considers 
issues that appear simple and unserious such as language barriers, to identify 
the dysfunctionality of the system. For instance, like Aja16 observes, in modern 
integration schemes, states do not take their differences for granted any longer 
for the sake of mutual trust and confidence. In integrating states through institu-
tional mechanism such as parliaments, banks, inter-ministerial committees and 
the likes, language is core in communication, comprehension and collaboration.   
 
The West African Ethnic and Language Profile 
 
Moving across the West African coastline, a fascinating and eye-opening 
discovery is that the borders are mere artificial barriers. The ethnicity and local 
language between two borderline towns between two countries are the same. 
From Idi Iroko in Nigeria to Igolo-Porto Novo and even Cotonou in Republic 
of Benin is the similarity of ethnic identity, culture, names and language. 
Whether the dialects are different is not an issue as even ethnic groups within 
same territorial sovereignty have different dialects; but the common ethnic 
group and language is Yoruba in these areas of Nigeria and Benin. In a similar 
vein, the borderline towns of Benin and Togo at Ave-Condji and Ilacondji re-
spectively are another case of artificial boundaries because the peoples of both 
towns and beyond are of the Ga ethnic and language group.  
From Baguida through Lome metropolis to Aflao and beyond are Ewe-
speaking people of Togo and Ghana. Aflao thus becomes another artificial 
boundary. The Mende group cuts across Liberia, Sierra Leone and parts of Ivo-
ry Coast, while as earlier highlighted, several countries in the West African 
region speak similar languages, albeit with some dialectical differences. The 
artificial boundaries are the borders created by the Europeans after the Berlin 
Conference of 1884-5 to demarcate their “spheres of influence” and authority.  
Deeper than the borders however were the artificial “nations” that emerged 
and the severance of close ties between the Yoruba of Benin and Nigeria, Ewe 
of Togo and Ghana, and Mandingo of The Gambia and Senegal, among other 
groups. The common denominator is either French or English language, which 
underlined totality of the way of life of the West African peoples- including 
social identity, culture, religion and language. Artificial boundaries and nations 
thus gave way to something much deeper and dividing for over a hundred 
years. At independence, the Africans had gotten accustomed to these dichoto-
mies and had begun to see themselves as either British or French. In any case, 
the Yoruba in Nigeria speak English while their kinsmen in Benin speak French 
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and the propensity of forgetting their common bond, the native language is 
high. The Ewe in Ghana became British while the Ewe in Togo were thorough-
ly Frenchified. These differences gave birth to a new Africa that became more 
westernized and more antagonistic of itself.  
Interestingly, the Europeans who applied this weapon of division were 
themselves allies of each other. Aside being neighbours, their relationship dated 
back to the Anglo-Saxon years of hostility and moved to the Middle Age col-
laborations and 18th, 19th and 20thc alliance against common European enemies. 
But back in Africa, nationalism gored them to carve out distinct African em-
pires and the best way to maintain their stranglehold unto the empires was by 
building sharply contrasting principles and identity that would keep the blocs 
safe. The policies of association and assimilation were an example, and the 
language factor became a more critical instrument to permanently keeping the 
divides apart17. 
 
ECOWAS Integration Policy 
 
Established at the instance of Nigeria and Togo in 1975, ECOWAS’ main 
thrust has been economic integration. In the Chapter II, Article 3 of the Revised 
ECOWAS Treaty, its other objective includes the promotion of regional eco-
nomic, social and cultural development through improved relations among 
member-states. Members of the organization are Burkina-Faso, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Benin, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Togo, which constitute the 
French Zone; and Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Liberia, The Gambia, Sierra Leone, 
Cape Verde and Liberia, that are regarded as the non-French-speaking coun-
tries.  
Gambari18, like other scholars have averred that ECOWAS is emblematic 
of Pan-Africanism, a movement that actually gained momentum in West Africa 
in the colonial times, ahead of other regions. It is important to state that the 
French-speaking countries were initially not willing to identify with ECOWAS, 
but soon began to embrace the idea with the pressure from Eyadema of Togo 
and Gowon of Nigeria. It took a lot of efforts on the part of Nigeria and Togo to 
change their disposition. Since its inception, ECOWAS, has been making giant 
strides in the area of community integrative schemes, such as liberalization of 
regional trade; liberalization of movement of persons, goods and services; har-
monization of monetary and fiscal policies; harmonization of business law; 
development of transport, communications and energy networks and involve-
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ment of private sectors in the regional integration process to enhance the inte-
gration of West African states19. 
The ECOWAS schemes and protocols have taken into consideration rele-
vance to the economic interests of the members and contribution to the ultimate 
goal of economic union20. The ECOWAS Protocol on free movement is consid-
ered quite significant to the overall objective of the ECOWAS initiative as such 
a factor is very critical to integration. The Protocol is cognizant of the cultural, 
social and emotional ties between families, groups and relations who have 
found themselves in different sovereign territories since colonial times, and 
aims at reducing the tight custom and immigration laws around the borders. It 
is expected that these would not only promote the cultural ties, but also galva-
nize regional trade and commerce, mutual cooperation and assistance, and ulti-
mately enhance national and international development21.  
The Protocol has on paper, been impressive as it drives to create Free 
Trade Area, Customs Union, Common Market, and so forth, which would 
eventually culminate in full-blown economic union. The Protocol on free 
movement confers on the Community citizens the right to enter and reside in 
the territory of any member-state, provided they possess valid travel documents 
and internationally acceptable health certificate. The Protocol however, also 
grants member-states the right to refuse admission to any Community citizens 
who are inadmissible under the member-state’s domestic law. For instance, the 
four supplementary protocols adopted between 1985 and 1990 committed 
member-states to provide valid travel document to their citizens, grant Com-
munity citizens the right of residence for the purpose of seeking and carrying 
out income-earning employment, ensure appropriate treatment for persons be-
ing expelled, not to expel Community citizens en masse, and limit the grounds 
for individual expulsion to reasons of national security or public order, et 
cetera22.  
The Protocol in reality is, however, a far cry from the principle. The border 
security agencies in almost all the West African frontiers have turned the bor-
ders to open fields for day-light robbery through extortions from even those 
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with legitimate documents and those without any travelling documents. The 
border posts collect tolls and tributes from legitimate travellers, collecting un-
receipted fees before entry-stamps are issued. The health officials do not care 
about using the temperature gadgets to detect and control Ebola and other 
transmittable regional diseases, but prefer to collect tolls for unavailability of 
health cards. The security posts officials are unduly harsh and would be more 
difficult with travellers from another zone- English or French23. These practices 
do not only hinder movement, but also puncture the objective of ECOWAS of 
friendliness, association and integration. 
Again, regional security, peace and trans-border movement is hampered by 
the collaboration between custom and immigration officials with criminals, 
smugglers, and illegal immigrants. With specified amount of money and sign 
language between the officials and the miscreants, trans-border movement is 
made at will. Again, money laundering, arms and drug deals are common 
across the borders, while the illegal currencies of certain countries are legal 
tenders in these areas. For instance, the outlawed Biafran Pound is spent in the 
borders of Togo-Benin, Togo-Ghana and Ghana-Ivory Coast24. Also replete are 
enormous number of barriers and roadblocks, as well as unnecessary stoppages 
on international roads in different countries, which frustrate the ECOWAS Pro-
tocol. In 2005, it was reported that about 44 Ghanaians were killed in The 
Gambia by unknown assailants while moving into that part of the region25. 
It is pertinent to state that while ECOWAS seems to mean well for regional 
free movement for integration and development, the lawlessness in the uncon-
trolled borders go unchecked, which makes nonsense of the regional initiative 
and objective. One critical area is language barrier and the emphasis on Fran-
cophone-Anglophone backgrounds at the frontiers, which ECOWAS leaders 
seem to pay little attention to, but which is a sore point in the futile attempts to 
integrate West Africa. 
 
The Bilingual Infractions 
  
Adebayo Adedeji once said: “The general view was that setting up a sub-
regional cooperation entity in West Africa that cuts across differences in lan-
guage, culture and the relative size and economic strengths was an idea whose 
time had come. And this seal was put on the determination to end the centuries 
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of division and artificial barriers imposed on the people of West Africa from 
outside”26. 
The assertion above clearly captures the essence of ECOWAS- ending 
once and for all, the centuries of artificial barriers and divisions created by the 
Europeans. Incidentally however, the bilingual issue has remained an albatross 
for ECOWAS. The language barrier is not only at the non-state or informal 
level, in which travellers, buyers and sellers, commuters and other entities find 
it difficult to communicate or develop distrust for one another; but even at the 
governmental level, ambassadors and government officials feel like strangers in 
the land of another West African country. It has been argued that even in 
ECOWAS, relationship between leaders and senior representatives is often 
characterized by distrust, suspicion and hostility, as leaders speaking the same 
European language often feel more comfortable with each other27. This submis-
sion is validated by the formation of a Francophone parallel of the ECOWAS in 
West Africa. 
The language factor is often explained away as the factor for hostility at the 
borders. From personal experience, crossing Francophone borders for someone 
from an English-speaking country is often tough. The customs, immigration 
police and gendarmeries would put up a hostile reception, stop the movement 
of the traveller, or delay him, subject such a person to unnecessary scrutiny and 
most times extort more money from him than from a co-French-speaking trav-
eller. Obtaining vehicle document (lassiez passé) is determined not by the 
ECOWAS Protocol, but by the foreign language a traveller can speak. A 
French-speaking driver who drives a Nigeria-registered vehicle in Grand Popo 
(Benin) is treated more courteously by the security operatives at the road blocks 
than an English-speaking driver who drives a Benin-registered vehicle in the 
same area. A Nigerian who is driving a car to Togo for the first time has to pay 
31,000 FCFA for laissez passé, while a Beninoise in the same category is billed 
10,000 FCFA only28. In a similar vein, custom and immigration officers in Ni-
geria who flags down a vehicle and discovers that the passengers can barely 
communicate in English but speak French fluently, even if they have all the 
necessary documents, subject the occupants to undue scrutiny.  
The hostility of Beninoise gendarmes towards Nigerians crossing the Seme 
border in Badagry, in spite of the stature and military might of the latter, is 
enormous and captured in several research and media literature. The hostility is 
however nothing compared to what an average Nigerian traveller faces at the 
Togo-Benin frontiers. This is explicable in the sense that the further the Nigeri-
an moves away from the Nigerian frontiers, the harsher the reception. The less 
harsh reception at Seme compared to Ilacondji is as a result of the nearness 
between Nigeria and Benin, who, aside the French and English language prob-
                                                 
26
 ECOWAS Regional Integration Processes and International Cooperation, “Cooperacion 
Espanola”, Vol. 4, Madrid, June 2014. 
27
 B. Akinbobola , op. cit., pp. 95-101. 
28
 S. Folar in, Discovering Nigeria’s Power… 
189 
lems, also share linguistic and cultural ties locally. The Yoruba and bits of 
French and English both sides can speak as well as the shared cultural and his-
torical heritages reduce the tensions. But this is not the case with Togo, a large-
ly Ewe-speaking group, which though belongs to the same Kwa-speaking lan-
guage family as the Yoruba of Nigeria, is distant by the lack of shared bounda-
ries and more by the distinction between the English and French ways of life 
entrenched in both countries. However, the reception to the Nigerian in Togo is 
yet less harsh compared to what the Nigerian will experience in Ivory Coast, 
another French-speaking country that has very little or no socio-cultural affinity 
with Nigeria. Aside being in the same linguistic family, many from the Ewe 
people of Togo have lived and worked in Nigeria, while so many of them still 
have families or relatives living and working in the country.  
Similarly, the fact that many Nigerians have established social links and 
businesses in Togo, some with families and wives there, they tend to be less 
hostile to Togolese people living in Nigeria. An average Nigerian family em-
ploys Togolese as domestic and office staff as well as patronizes their artisans 
because of their professionalism in their services. This kind of social affinity 
has reduced the hostility toward the Togolese crossing Nigerian borders or liv-
ing in Nigeria. 
It is instructive to note that despite all the troubles, hostilities and long dis-
tances encountered by a Ghanaian crossing the borders from Ghana to Togo, 
and Togo to Benin, the average Ghanaian traveller finds warm reception at the 
Nigerian borders of Idiroko or Seme. What simply explains this is the language 
and colonial bond between the two countries. A Beninoise crossing the Togo-
lese border will pay an illegitimate fee of 200 FCFA only, while a Nigerian 
crossing the same border will be compelled to pay 2,000 FCFA as a first-time 
crosser (if he has an international passport to show) or 1,000 FCFA as an old-
timer29. The issue in this case is the colonial and language factor.  
 
A Pragmatic Approach to Integration: The Multilingual/Bilingual  
Academic Curriculum Options 
 
The central argument of this paper is that the sharp language differences 
have created artificial but enormous barriers to mutual understanding, trust, 
confidence, sincerity, cooperation and integration among West Africans. Lan-
guage is a unifying force; it is also a divisive tool. Global events and indeed 
configurations of power have been formed along linguistic lines. Natural allies 
of powerful states are first and foremost those that can understand and com-
municate in similar language30. Hitler attempted to create a Greater Germany 
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around all Germanic people, thereby bringing several other states together by 
force because of the same ethnicity and language. The Second World War 
erupted in the course of this. Hence, ethnicity (nationalism) and language could 
be said to have caused the Second World War.  
The Europeans understood this and that was why the first thing at coloniza-
tion, was to change the tongue, mind and identity of the subjects. The attach-
ments to the master would be built around the similar identity shared. West 
Africa and indeed the rest of Africa have been in these dire straits for a long 
time. The sense of belonging has been towards Europe- the direct colonial mas-
ter- and not towards fellow Africans. Of course, the allegiance and subordina-
tion go to the ex-metropoles as well. As such, Africa would remain in a perpet-
ual position of subjugation as the social and political divisions would not allow 
for joint or collective will to ward off neo-colonialism.  
The ECOWAS leaders would require more decisive measures channeled at 
the social clime rather than always seeking political solutions to West Africa’s 
disintegration or lack of integration. The Protocol on free movement is a good 
one because it promotes people to people interaction, which is more effective 
for integration. But the organization has to raise a committee that will monitor 
the land and sea borders as well as the airports to ensure that the Protocol terms 
and commitments are adhered to by security personnel of each country. There 
should also be dedicated military patrol team by each country to see to it that 
best practices stipulated by the ECOWAS Protocol are observed. The free and 
legitimate movement of persons, goods and services will enhance more of in-
formal international collaboration that would lead to unity, rather than the plac-
id and uncertain government to government interactions that have characterized 
ECOWAS over time. 
A more effective way to facilitate de-colonization of West Africa and free-
ing up of the minds of the peoples to relate more with one another, which 
would enhance integration, is the agreement among ECOWAS leaders to im-
plement a school curriculum in which four major indigenous languages in West 
Africa will be taught from primary to secondary schools. The four most spoken 
languages are considered to be Hausa, Mandingo, Yoruba and Peul. ECOWAS 
can decide better what the languages should be. However, pupils in West Afri-
can schools should be compelled to pick at least two of the languages. Coun-
tries where the languages are common should make it mandatory for the stu-
dents not to pick their indigenous language as one of the compulsory African 
languages to undertake. For instance, Hausa and Yoruba, which are widely 
spoken in Nigeria, should not be an option for the Southwestern schools and 
Northern schools in Nigeria respectively. Hausa is spoken in Northern Togo, 
Benin and Ghana, and beyond. The language will not be an option there. This 
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should be institutionalized so much that Hausa or Mandingo will become one 
of the official languages in ECOWAS assemblies and summits. 
Also, all governments should agree that West African universities make 
French and English compulsory at the undergraduate level for all students from 
the first to the final year. Alternatively, French should be made compulsory in 
Anglophone countries and English made compulsory for students in Franco-
phone countries at the undergraduate level. Portuguese or Latin can be made an 
option. This will make every West African automatically bilingual in foreign 
languages and make communication and interaction with fellow West Africans 
easier. Anyone would have the ability and ease of switching to any language 
and the “borders” would have either been reduced or dismantled. In this way, 
the allegiance will be towards a fellow West African, and not to a foreigner 
whose interest is for the self and not to any former subject. By this, ECOWAS 
would find it easier to implement its integration agenda in the region. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The multilingual approach as far as local African languages is concerned 
and bilingualism in terms of western languages will be a mileage towards the 
reduction of the artificial borders in West Africa. The sub-continent has for too 
long been hijacked by the former colonial masters, whose colonial strategy of 
divide and rule, perpetuated by language barriers, has made regional coopera-
tion and integration a herculean task.  
ECOWAS leaders have the responsibility to be true to itself and set the re-
gion free from the stranglehold of neo-colonialism. It is understandable that it 
will be difficult to be assertive when some of these countries depend on the 
former colonial masters for virtually everything. But, it must be thought-out 
and realized too, that when there is economic and political synergy among West 
African states and peoples, as one indivisible group, they would pull down ad-
versities and overcome challenges and grow into a formidable economic force. 
 
 
Bibliography: 
 
Books and articles: 
 
 Adetula V.A., ECOWAS and the Challenges of Integration in Africa, 
[in:] Milestones in Regional Integration, U.J. Ogwu, W.O. Alli  (eds.), 
Lagos 2009. 
 Aja A.A., Selected Themes in International Economic Relations, 
Ogui-Enugu 2002. 
 Akinbobola B. , Regional Integration in West Africa: Challenge for 
Emergent States, Lagos 2007. 
192 
 Akinterinwa B.A., French Security Arrangements with Francophone 
Africa: Implications for Nigeria’s Relations with its Immediate Neigh-
bours, [in:] Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbours: Constraints and 
Prospects of Sub-Regional Security in the 1990s, B.E. Ate, B.A. 
Akinterinwa (eds.), Lagos 1992. 
 Asiwaju A.I., Borderlands Research: A Comparative Perspective, El 
Paso 1983. 
 Ate B.E., The Presence of France in West-Central Africa as Funda-
mental Problem to Nigeria, [in:] Nigeria and Its Immediate Neigh-
bours: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-Regional Security in the 
1990s, B.E. Ate, B.A. Akinterinwa (eds.), Lagos 1992. 
 Ate B.E., Akinterinwa B.A., Cross-border Armed Banditry in the 
Northeast: Issues in National Security and Nigeria’s Relations with its 
Immediate Neighbours, Lagos 2011. 
 Bulmer S. , Domestic Politics and European Community Policy-
Making, “JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies” Volume 21, Is-
sue 4, June 1983, pp. 349–364. 
 ECOWAS Regional Integration Processes and International Coopera-
tion, “Cooperacion Espanola”, Vol. 4, Madrid, June 2014. 
 Fayomi O., Adeola G.L., ECOWAS and Sub-Regional Integration in 
West Africa: An Appraisal, “Covenant University Journal of Politics 
and International Affairs”, Vol. 3 (1), 2015, pp. 7-13. 
 Folarin S., Discovering Nigeria’s Power and Influence in West Africa, 
“National Mirror”, Lagos, July 2015. 
 Folarin S. , Biafran Pound as a Legal Tender in West Africa, “Nation-
al Mirror”, Lagos, August 2015. 
 Folarin S. , Obstacles to ECOWAS Integration, “National Mirror”, 
Lagos, February 2014. 
 Folarin S., The ECOWAS “Disintegration” Process, “National Mir-
ror”, Lagos, May 2011, p. 12. 
 Gambari I.A., Political and Comparative Dimensions of Regional In-
tegration: The Case of ECOWAS, New Jersey 1991. 
 Murder of 44 Ghanaians: Gambian President Ordered Killings, “Gha-
naian Times” 9.08.2007, No. 15, 188. 
 Gowon Y., The Economic Community of West African States: A Study 
in Political and Economic Integration, PhD Thesis, University of War-
wick 1984. 
 Kwanashie M., Historical Perspective on the Scramble for Africa, 
[in:] New Scramble for Africa, C.E. Osita, C.A. Anigbo (ed.), Lagos 
2010. 
 LAAF, The West African Languages, <http://www.laaf.me/en/west-
africa/the-west-african-languages.php> (24.08.2015). 
 Lansana G., Review of Africa and the War on Drugs by N. Carrier, 
G. Klantschnig,  
193 
<https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2013/01/22/review-of-africa-
and-the-war-on-drugs-by-neil-carrier-and-gernot-klantschnig/> 
(25.08.2015). 
 Le Vine V.T., Politics in Francophone Africa, London 2004.  
 Lodge J., EC Policymaking: Institutional Dynamics, [in:] The Europe-
an Community and the Challenge of the Future, J. Lodge (ed.), Lon-
don 1993. 
 Middleton J., Black Africa: Its Peoples and their Cultures Today, 
London 1970. 
 Obiozor G., Olikoshi  A., Obi C., The Challenge of West African 
Regional Integration: An Introductory Overview, [in:] G. Obiozor, A. 
Olikoshi , C. Obi (eds.), West African Regional Economic Integra-
tion: Nigerian Policy Perspectives For The 1990s, Lagos 1996. 
 Omole B., Nigeria, France and the Francophone States: The Joy and 
Anguish of a Regional Power. 225th Inaugural Lecture, Ile-Ife 2010. 
 Opanike A., Aduloju A.A., Adenipekun L.O., ECOWAS Protocol 
on Free Movement and Trans-border Security in West Africa, ”Cove-
nant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs”, Vol. 3(1) 
2015, pp. 14-18. 
 Orwell G., Politics and the English Language, 
<http://www.npr.org/blogs/ombudsman/Politics_and_the_English_Lan
guage-1.pdf> (26.08.2015). 
 Rajagopalan K., The Politics of Language and the Concept of Lin-
guistic Identity, “CAUCE:Revista de Filologíay su Didáctica”, No. 24, 
2001, pp. 17-28. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
